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Abstract
Epistemic diversity is the ability or possibility of producing diverse and rich epis-
temic apparati to make sense of the world around us. In this paper we discuss
whether, and to what extent, different conceptions of knowledge – notably as
‘justified true belief’ and as ‘distributed and embodied cognition’ – hinder or fos-
ter epistemic diversity. We then link this discussion to the widespread move in
science and philosophy towards monolingual disciplinary environments. We ar-
gue that English, despite all appearance, is no Lingua Franca, and we give rea-
sons why epistemic diversity is also deeply hindered is monolingual contexts.
Finally, we sketch a proposal for multilingual academia where epistemic diver-
sity is thereby fostered.
Keywords: Epistemic diversity; Lingua Franca; language of science; linguistic
justice.
1 Knowledge and epistemic diversity
A core philosophical question concerns understanding what knowledge is. This has
occupied large part of the philosophical enterprise since the ancient times and is still
a vibrant area of research within different philosophical traditions. Related to the
question of what knowledge is, there is also the question of how to build knowledge,
which can be thought of being at the core of scientific method on the one hand, and of
philosophical argumentation on the other hand. These two questions - what knowl-
edge is and how to build it - must be somehow connected. It is in fact dubious to have
a theory of knowledge in which the what and how questions are unrelated. Yet, how
exactly they are connected is contentious and one might wonder whether the second
should be derived from the first, or vice versa.
In the first part of the paper we explore whether and to what extent different con-
ceptions of knowledge lead to different ways of building it. Specifically, we take issue
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with the still dominant view in analytic philosophy that sees knowledge as justified
true belief (for short, JTB) and with the styles of argumentation (i.e., the way in which
philosophy builds knowledge) that stem from it. We then examine the prospects of a
different view of knowledge, notably as distributed and embodied cognition, and of a
different way of building arguments. Our investigation into a different conception of
knowledge and into a different way of building it is motivated by the idea of fostering
epistemic diversity, which seems to be hindered by JTB. We think that an altogether
different view on knowledge has important practical implications, for instance about
assessment criteria (say, in peer review) or in handling disagreement (in philosophy
and elsewhere).
In the second part of the paper we connect the question of how to conceive of
knowledge to questions related to the working language in which they happen. We
submit that this connection is not done in the literature and we offer reasons for its
importance, relevance, and timeliness. In particular, we wish to broaden the perspec-
tive and problematize the question of epistemic diversity as a possible effect of what
we deem a dangerous trend: the move towards monolingual disciplinary environ-
ments. We take analytic philosophy (which Anglo-American philosophy of science
belongs to) as a paradigmatic example of such tendency, although such move is vis-
ible in philosophy more generally, and certainly in the sciences. While the search
for the perfect language has been a long-standing objective of science and of philos-
ophy itself, the very notion of ‘Lingua Franca’ should be problematized. We show
that a monolingual environment is not only detrimental to knowledge production it-
self (whence our worry about epistemic diversity), but is also not in line with most
present and past realities in philosophy and in science, which are insteadmultilingual.
We therefore raise the issue of linguistic justice as an important concern for commu-
nication in philosophy and in science, one that is deeply connected to the questions
of knowledge, discussed the first part of the paper.
2 Epistemic diversity
We call ‘epistemic diversity’ the ability or possibility of producing diverse and rich
epistemic apparati to make sense of the world around us. Such epistemic apparati may
be sophisticated philosophical conceptualisations or theories, or their corresponding
folk theories that each one of us has, in virtue of their experience as epistemic agent
and language user in given cultural contexts. In this section, we discuss how dif-
ferente conceptions of knowledge may hinder or foster epistemic diversity; subse-
quently, we link this discussion to the widespread move in philosophy and science
towards a monolingual disciplinary environment.
A central concept in philosophy is ‘knowledge’. Arguably, answering the ques-
tion of what knowledge is (or, differently put, understanding what knowledge is) is
not independent from the ways in which we build knowledge (which, admittedly, is a
question at the core of philosophical argumentation and of scientific method).
According to an established tradition in philosophy, to understand what knowl-
edge is means to state the conditions under which we have knowledge of a given
proposition. We speak then of ‘propositional knowledge’, and knowledge is, in this
approach, a justified true belief (JTB). While JTB has been effectively refuted already
by Gettier, the view is still dominant in that it drives large part of contemporary re-
search in epistemology. Specifically, in analytic philosophy, ‘knowledge’ is typically
analysed as follows:
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A subject S knows that p if, and only if:
1. p is true,
2. S believes that p,
3. S is justified in believing in p.
Critical aspects of this analysis have been identified as early as 1963 in the well
known study of Gettier [1963]. And yet, analytic philosophy has been hardworking in
providing conditions and specifications that wouldmake the previous analysis correct
or at least viable. We lack space to make justice to the sophisticated and elaborated
philosophical production to defend this idea, and we direct the reader to the thorough
introductions to this view and to the corresponding debates by Ichikawa and Steup
[2017], Steup [2017]. Despite the well known critical aspects of JTB, the view is still
on today’s research agenda (see e.g. Turri [2012], Kraft [2012], or Dutant [2015]); at
the same time, altogether different views are explored, for instance in the philosophy
of information (see e.g. Dretske [1983], Dretske [2008], Floridi [2004], Floridi [2012]).
JTB presupposes that knowledge is propositional – whether it is mainly, solely, or
perhaps essentially propositional does not matter here. What does matter is that,
because knowledge is expressed propositionally, one can say under what conditions
a subject S knows something (‘that p’). Implicit in the analysis is that subjects are
individuals, often idealised and fully rational, epistemic agents and that ‘to know that
p’ requires some form of correspondence between the proposition (p) and the world (a
state of affair, a fact, etc.) – on theories of truth and especially on the correspondence
theory, see David [2016].
Now, while analyses along those lines have the clear merit of being precise, rigor-
ous, and neat, one might wonder whether, to maintain such a high level of conceptual
rigour, we are also paying a high price. In particular, one might wonder who this
epistemic agent is and whether s/he is far too idealised, or whether a correspondence
theory of truth provides an adequate account of the relations between our language
and the world (for an example of such criticism, see Radder [2017]). Another issue
concerns the distinction between ‘know that’ and ‘know how’; in the ‘intellectualist’
approach of Stanley and Williamson [2001] and Stanley [2011], ‘knowing how’ is a
form of answering questions to be expressed in propositions. It should be noted in
that the critical assessment of the aforementioned Radder [2017] also concerns the
‘materiality’ of ‘know how’, which in his view cannot be fully accounted for with a
propositional concept of knowledge. In fact, the ‘materiality’ of knowledge is an as-
pect that non-analytic philosophers of science also paid attention to, see e.g. Baird
[2004].
It is not our intention to enter the debate and to weight the merit or shortcomings
of the many debates around propositional concepts of knowledge. Instead, we wish
to establish a link between what knowledge is and how to build it. In particular,
embracing some form of JTB leads to producing knowledge (i.e. building arguments)
that hinders, rather than fosters, epistemic diversity. In this section, we highlight
reasons related to the preferred argumentation strategies; later in the paper, we also
give reasons related to working in a monolingual rather than multilingual academic
environment.
To see how that may be the case, one may browse serendipically mainstream jour-
nals in analytic philosophy (including Anglo-American philosophy of science). The
way in which, in philosophy, we produce knowledge is by designing arguments to
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the effect that a given claim is well supported by evidence and by given inferential
rules. It won’t take long to recognise patterns in the set up of an article’s argumen-
tation strategy. Ideas are often presented rhetorically as logical consequences of a
given set of premises, as negative results established from an analysis of a competing
view or theory, or as knock-down counterexamples to a proposed view or account.
What we take issue with is not the rigour in the thinking. One motivation of the
founding scholars of analytic philosophy was the insistence on a precise, rigorous,
and empirically-based reasoning. This, we believe, has value. Also, there is of course
value in discovering mistakes and pointing them out. What we take issue with is in
case the only goal is to prove a negative point, with no contextualisation of why the
mistake needs to be corrected.
Let us emphasise, we are far from trying to demonise analytic philosophy. What
we take issue with is the standardization of argumentation, which, we think, hinders
epistemic diversity. Arguments do come in a variety of forms – Millgram [2001] ,
for instance, surveys the ones used in practical reasoning and makes the point that
choosing one or the one may have important repercussions on ethical theory or other
areas. But analytic philosophy de facto limited the admissible ones.
As Preston [2010] has noticed, analytic philosophy became somehow victim of its
own commendable principles: rigour became a value on its own, at the expenses of
the contents. In a similar vein, Van Inwagen [2006]) seems to suggest that central to
analytic philosophy is the (style of) analysis of concepts, and less their contents. Anal-
ogous remarks are likewise made by Schliesser in a recent blog post and interview.1
The level of technicality reached by present-day analytic contributions has greatly
increased; however, this has also led to a debate that became much inward- rather
than outward looking. A sign of this is the lack of self-reflection in the field, although
the problem begins to be recognised, thanks especially to metaphilosophical discus-
sions in experimental philosophy - see for instance the recent contributions of Nado
[2016], Machery [2017]. In history and philosophy of science, instead, many sub-fields
other than Anglo-American philosophy of science produced important reflections on
their own identity, methods, or preferred topics - see, among others: Andler [2009];
Boon [2017]; Chang [1999]; Longino [1987]; Massimi [2009]; Radder [1997]; Schickore
[2011]; Schliesser [2006], Schliesser [2011].
It is therefore in this sense that Preston [2010] talks about the illusion of ana-
lytic philosophy, because, somehow, it did not live up to its own standards (let alone
reflect on them). To be fair, Preston also mentions the illusion of continental phi-
losophy, but he doesn’t quite develop it further. So perhaps, at the other end of the
spectrum, another story ought to be told about the illusion of an all-and-only culture-
and context-based continental philosophy. If one were to tell such a story, good places
to start would definitively be D’Agostini [1997] and Glock [2008].
This standardization of argumentation de facto coincides with the use of English
as the main (or sole) language for scientific communication. In section 3, we try to
reconstruct the lineage between the kinds of standardization of argumentation alluded
above and the standardization of language. In the remaining part of this section we
explore whether, and to what extent, a different conceptualization of knowledge may
lead to a different way of building it, thus fostering epistemic diversity.
Alternative views of what knowledge is have been proposed in the fields of phi-





[2011a]; Giere [2010]; Leonelli [2014]; Nersessian [2008]; Russo [2016]. What emerges
from these contributions is that knowledge, rather than being reduced to the propo-
sitions in which we express it, is to be understood as a distributed and embodied
phenomenon. Accounts of distributed and embodied cognition make the point that
knowledge is not ‘owned’ by a single, individual agent, but is instead distributed
across individuals and across groups of different epistemic agents (be they human,
artificial, or hybrid). Knowledge is also distributed across socio-technical systems
that we humans belong to. Our being part of these systems makes knowledge also
embodied, in the sense that it is not merely or purely an intellectual, abstract ‘thing’,
but very much part of our material relation with the surrounding world. In such a
framework, knowledge is not simply about establishing the right sort of ‘correspon-
dence’ with the world, but rather the right sort of connections. The correctness theory
of truth developed in the philosophy of information helps here (Floridi [2011b]), as
it abandons a monolithic, absolute conception of truth, in favour of a concept that is
relative to a given model for handling information, and does not require what Tarski
called the ‘classical conception’ of truth, one that establishes a correspondence be-
tween language and reality.
Embracing a conception of knowledge as distributed and embodied cognition fos-
ters epistemic diversity because we are forced to consider all sorts of non-propositional
factors that may play a role at any step of the process of knowledge production: so-
cial and cultural relations, interaction with technology, the use of specific concep-
tual frameworks, and also the use of different vehicular languages. This is is much
broader and inclusive than a merely propositional conception of knowledge. Interest-
ingly enough, broadening the notion of knowledge beyond its propositional nature,
may also shed light on classic debates in philosophy of science, notably about ‘scien-
tific progress’. According to Mizrahi [2013], for instance, scientific progress is more
than a simple accumulation of true propositions. An (historically-informed) analysis
of actual cases from the scientific practice shows, according to him, that (scientific)
knowledge ought to include ‘know-how’ besides ‘know-that’. We take Mizrahi’s ar-
gument to lend support to our point, namely that knowledge is not to be reduced to
propositions.
Given the large difference between the two approaches to knowledge, the ques-
tion looms large: why going for distributed and embodied cognition, rather than JTB?
From a philosophy of science perspective, it suffices to look at the practice of the sci-
ences (and of philosophy too) to realize how much knowledge is a collective endeav-
our, where individuals interact with one another and with technological equipments
(from labs to computers to digital humanities tools) in specific institutional and social
settings. Knowledge, while clearly expressed in propositional form in academic publi-
cations and conferences, is not to be reduced to it. From a more distinctive philosoph-
ical perspective, such conception of knowledge is not trapped in the straightjacket of
rigid argumentation strategies. While rigour should remain a fundamental value in
philosophy and in science, we can here concentrate on the contents of the arguments
rather than on their mere structure.
Take philosophical contributions as the hallmark of the way we build knowledge.
What we propose below is not a rigid scheme to structure a paper or a conference
presentation, but rather is a ‘flexible epistemological strategy’ to produce valuable
philosophy. While at a first glance what follows can be seen as an oversimplifica-
tion, we believe it captures the gist of a strategy that can go counter an increasingly
individualistic and confrontational academic culture.
To begin with, we should engage with a problem. Far too often we write papers
5
that are narrow in scope, and that focus on details losing sight of a deeper problem
that might lie behind. Why should we really care about taking issue with footnoteX
in the paper Y of Author Z? The footnote might be problematic, but if it is so, that
must be explained with respect to a context. So, if there is a problem somewhere in the
literature, we should say what we want to do with the problem: Analyse it? Solve it?
Redress the debate? These are all different goals, and we should be clear about what
we want to achieve in our contribution. Being clear about our goal will also help our
readers engage with our project. Next, we should remember that we don’t write and
think in a vacuum. Acknowledging other people’s contribution shows that there is an
issue that the community is trying to address. We don’t own problems, nor solutions.
The view of knowledge as distributed and embodied cognition also means that it is
a collective enterprise and each one of us is contributing something to it, no matter
how tiny the contribution may be. This is to say that, in this collective enterprise
it is unclear what we gain in proving each other wrong. Instead, it is a much more
constructive attitude to identify problems in order to attempt a solution. Finally, we
should aim to take the debate a step further by putting forward a proposal. Most likely
it is not going to be the end of the debate, and we should humbly assert what we think
our tiny contribution to solving the problem is.
This strategy, we think, can shed light on how disagreement in philosophy ought
to be handled. If the goal is not to prove each other’s wrong, what do we disagree on?
The epistemological strategy sketched above helps understand whether disagreement
concerns, for instance, the reconstruction of state of the art, or the framing of the
problem. Or perhaps it is about the relevance of the research question, or indeed
about the contents of a proposed solution. In any of these cases we can contribute to
make progress, rather than concluding with a negative result. So negative results are
indeed important, but they shouldn’t be the goal of a philosophical project - the goal
should instead be to positively contributing to a debate. Whether we make progress
by establishing negative results also depends on how one understands progress in
philosophy. We here take side with Floridi [2013], who conceives of a philosophical
question as one that is inherently open-ended (and that can genuinely be informed
by rational and honest disagreement); Floridi’s position is however different from
the ‘reasonable optimism’ defended by Stoljar [2017]. We instead do not side with
other scholars such as Chalmers [2015], van Inwagen [2004], who think that progress
is made by gradually converging towards truth – and that, they argue, isn’t quite
happening in philosophy.
All this does not imply that we will always reach consensus, but it encourages
a respectful interaction where we acknowledge disagreement, rather than demonise
or patronise the other party. So, even if disagreement is not resolved, we can learn
something, for instance about differences in the contents, norms, or perspectives. This
has obvious consequences for assessment criteria, for instance in peer-review. The
goal is not to compromise on quality and rigour in thinking, but in opposing practices
that are rapidly spreading. When reviewing a paper, we should ask ourselves the
questionwhetherwe are attempting a constructive, critical assessment, or whetherwe
are justifying aggressive, patronising, disrespectful arguments behind the protection
of blind review. But also, we might question the meaning of prizes for the ‘best paper’.
What does ‘best’ mean? How dowe assess brave papers that champion a new concept,
or that attempt genuine inter- or trans-disciplinary dialogues? Or that try to get out of
the ivory tower of philosophy and try to reach out, say, policy makers? The strategies
to write a successful paper aimed at non-philosophers may diverge from the accepted
norms and standards within the field. How do we assess such contributions? While it
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is beyond the scope and aims of this paper to provide recipes to address these issues,
we believe it is nonetheless important to bring them to the fore for discussion.
The epistemological strategy we propose aims to promote diversity: about ideas,
about traditions (philosophical or scientific), and also about language use. In fact, it
is meant to facilitate and encourage inclusion of considerations about sociological as-
pects, values, or cultural components. After all, knowledge is not just propositional,
and philosophical concepts (such as ‘knowledge’), no matter how sharply can be de-
fined, are not merely abstract and theoretical. Concepts and theories are products of
our philosophical and scientific investigations, just as they are products of our cul-
tures, and this includes language in a fundamental way.
The epistemological point we want to make about epistemic diversity is also re-
lated to the competitive, confrontational, and individualistic cultural that is becoming
established in academia. We should instead develop (or perhaps rediscover) argu-
mentations strategies that, in addressing any philosophical problems, foster dialogue
and collegiality rather than individualistic and confrontational attitudes. We claim
no originality in making this point, but we wish to add to arguments made already
within feminist scholarship – see Easley [1997]; Hundleby [2018]; Rooney [2010] and
references therein. Feminist argumentation theory takes issue with widespread argu-
mentation styles that favour confrontation and individualistic attitudes. These con-
tributions link such traits to gender aspects, and most probably this is not unrelated
to well-known, heavy gender imbalances in philosophy (see Beebee and Saul [2011];
Haslanger [2008]; Hutchison [2013] and references therein). The need for a dialogical
(rather than adversarial) form of argumentation is also discussed in logic and philo-
sophical logic, as part of a debate on the nature and structure of arguments - see
e.g. Dutilh Novaes [2015]. In our view, the move towards monolingual disciplinary
environments (therefore raising the question of English as Lingua Franca) adds an-
other perspective to the arguments offered within this literature.
One may rebut that, however, the view of knowledge as distributed and embodied
cognition is a product of Anglo-American academe, being written in English. Indeed
it is, but with an important qualification. Many of these scholars, who do care about
epistemic diversity, do not work in ‘mainstream’ philosophy of science, but rather in
other philosophical schools such as ‘philosophy of science in practice’, ‘history and
philosophy of science’, or ‘philosophy of information’, all of which tried, in different
ways, to re-open the doors of philosophy to neighbouring disciplines in the sciences
and in the humanities. More to the point, one could say that, notwithstanding the hard
battles to establish such results in Anglo-American debates, similar ideas were already
circulating in non-English speaking philosophy previously and almost unnoticed –
the contributions of Merleau-Ponty, or of the French epistemologists, from Bachelard
to Latour, come to mind. So we’d better make our language policy as open as possible
to (re)integrate non-English traditions, contrasting the current tendency with a more
balanced multilingual strategy, that we will present in the concluding section.
From a more sociological perspective, in academic as well as everyday settings,
we routinely build connections with other people’s work, getting feedback on writ-
ten pieces or on presentations. In short: it is never just our own idea, expressed in
the form of ‘that p’. We might have gotten the wrong impression that ideas belong
to single individual minds from reconstructions of the history of philosophy, which
depicted the complex conceptual architectures of say, Leibniz or Kant, and that there-
fore return to us only a partial image of the philosophical enterprise. For one thing,
these thinkers entertained relations with other intellectuals (from other cultures and
speaking other languages) of their time that are far too often neglected. For another,
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and relatedly, far too often women have been excluded from these histories, thus con-
veying the idea that philosophy is a ‘male thing’, requiring skills that men, more than
women, have (see e.g. Broad [2015]).
For all these reasons, we submit that the epistemological approach to knowledge
production just sketched can be the basis for a multilingual academic environment
and editorial policies, as discussed later in the paper.
We began the discussion of epistemic diversity raising genuine philosophical ques-
tions about the nature of knowledge and of the way of producing it (in philosophy,
this largely coincide with building arguments). But ultimately our aim is to connect a
genuine philosophical problemwith a more a historically- and sociologically-oriented
issue, namely how and why philosophy and science by and large shifted towards a
mono-lingual environment. Our goal is to show that the language in which we ex-
press knowledge has a deep influence on epistemic diversity.
3 From multilingual to monolingual disciplinary
environments
Themajority of today’s scholars, regardless of their field, take for granted that English
is the language of science, a Lingua Franca for different language users, including non-
native speakers. Philosophy is no exception in this respect. But this was not always
the case. With ‘language(s) of science’ we mean here the languages used to publish
innovative results in the various scientific disciplines, therefore excluding textbooks
and other didactic materials, as well as translations.
There is an important question related to how we should set up didactic pro-
grammes that increasingly attract (or aim to attract) international students. This is
– at the time of writing – the object of a vivid controversy in academia. The debate
raised by the expansion of English in teaching programmes of universities in Nordic
countries – see Airey et al. [2017] – and the recent verdict in Italy – see the recent
Salomone [2018] – are just two examples of why it is high time to have a thorough
discussion about the viability or desirability of ‘English-only’ programmes. The Eras-
mus programme of the EU is also a good example: born to promote exchange between
cultures and languages at university level, in practice student mobility nowadays hap-
pens onlywhere universities offer courses in English. While we think that these issues
ought to be urgently addressed, we defer a full discussion to another time, and here
concentrate on knowledge production at the level of research.
In a series of publications, Ulrich Ammon investigates the languages of science
used throughout the 20th century (Ammon [1999], Ammon [2001], Ammon [2006]).
He shows that the relative equilibrium that the languages of science – i.e. German,
French and English, in this order of importance – reached in the early years of the
20th century would be lost in the aftermath of the First World War. Although Am-
mon’s studies focus on the languages of science it seems plausible that philosophy too
was in an analogue situation (van Weijen [2013]). Back then, the quest for a neutral
language of science (and diplomacy, in order to foster peace among nations) was part
of the discussion of public opinion. The adjective ‘neutral’ here addresses the need
of a non-ethnic language, planned ad hoc for communication among speakers of dif-
ferent mother tongues, following a positivistic idea of culture-free neutrality. In the
terminology of those times, such languages, invented for ethical purposes, were called
International Auxiliary Languages (IALs, for short; see section 4). Two of them, Es-
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peranto and Ido, have been used for a couple of decades as languages of science with
non-irrelevant numbers – see de Kloe [2016], Gordin [2015]. In particular, Esperanto
is still used today as a language of science – even if with tiny numbers compared to
English – and there is even a university institution in San Marino that uses Esperanto
as the main working language (Gobbo and Fößmeier [2012]).
The main point we want to stress here is the fact that the term ‘neutral’ used for
IALs is very different from ‘franca’ in the case of the Lingua Franca. In fact, while
in the case of a IAL, such as Esperanto, freedom comes as an a priori property, in the
case of Lingua Franca the (supposed) freedom comes only a posteriori, because of the
spread of an idiom which emerged originally from a well-defined ethnic group, i.e.
English. As we will see in detail in section 4, English as a Lingua Franca attempts
to avoid all the consequences of discrimination and unfair advantage of English per
se; and yet, native speakers are de jure and de facto in an more privileged position,
compared to non-native speakers.
In order to exemplify what stated until now, let’s take the case of analytic phi-
losophy. Analytic philosophy speaks English. This is a fact. But why is it so? This
requires some attention and, as we shall see in elucidating the reasons that led ana-
lytic philosophers to speak English, this choice can be problematized, and suggestions
for a multilingual setting can be formulated. Here, we analyse the case of ‘English in
analytic philosophy’ as one of the languages of science, as defined above. As it will
become clear throughout the discussion, the (implicit) language policy of analytic phi-
losophy highly influenced the research agenda of the field. It is reasonable to think
that analogous arguments hold for other sub-fields in philosophy and for the sciences.
Analytic philosophy is a sub-discipline of philosophy typically associated with the
work scholars based in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia. It is often
contrasted with ‘continental philosophy’, which is instead practiced on the European
continent (and surely elsewhere). In using the term ‘analytic philosophy’, we broadly
refer to (analytic) philosophy of language, (analytic) ontology, philosophy of mind,
and also (analytic or Anglo-American) philosophy of science. The geographical dis-
tribution of these philosophical sub-fields is typically associated with the main work-
ing language on the one hand, and with preferred topics and approaches on the other
hand. A thorough reconstruction of the analytic-continental divide in all its historical,
conceptual, sociological, and institutional subtleties is well beyond the scope of this
paper; useful historico-philosophical reconstructions can be found in e.g. D’Agostini
[1997]; Glock [2008]; Preston [2010], Preston [2017], and for a bold attempt of rec-
onciliation, see Barris [2012]. We are here interested in a drawing the main line that
lead fields in philosophy from multi-lingual to largely mono-lingual environments.
To this end, we recall two important episodes that led English to be the main – and
perhaps sole – working language of contemporary analytic philosophy.
The first episode is the emergence of analytic philosophy in the early days of the
20th century; the leading figures of George Edward Moore and Bertrand Russell are
generally acknowledged as the founding fathers. From a methodological point of
view, the main change is the central role given to the linguistic analysis. For Russell,
in particular, natural languages are inherently ambiguous and therefore philosophical
inquiries should not only work on their object of interest, but also at the meta-level of
the language used to reason over the object itself. In particular, Russell resumed and
actualized Leibniz’s programme (Calculemus!) and tried to define a formal language
expressed in terms of symbolic logic. He thought that true meaning of statements
could be revealed through their logical form and by using Peano’s notation, whom
he met during the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900. Russell fa-
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mously said that that was “the most important year of my intellectual life” Russell
[1989], 12). Even if we know that his line of research, culminating in the Principia
Mathematica, did not succeed because of the fundamental results established by Kurt
Gödel (see Davis [2000]), Russell never considered English language to be the one and
only possible natural language for expressing the commentaries on the statements in
the formal language. Despite it was not part of Russell’s philosophy to impose En-
glish as the sole object of study of philosophy of language, English effectively became
both the main working language and the object of study in the analytic philosophy
that originated from his work. In Russell’s times, moreover, there was a vivid de-
bate among philosophers, scientists, and scholars in general on the role played by the
various languages used in science, most notably French, German and English (in this
very order of importance), with a more marginal role of Italian, Spanish, Russian and
Japanese, and a discussion about IALs such as Esperanto and Ido (see Gordin [2015]).
Ironically enough, over the years, the more ‘language’ became the object and the
main instrument to do analytic philosophy, the more English became the language of
the field. In fact, the fortunes of the school of analytic philosophy will be mainly in
British and North American universities and research institutions, and therefore the
use of English as the vehicle for transmission of analytic philosophical ideas became
predominant and unchallenged, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War,
where the focus shifted towards the analysis of ordinary language, with Austin [1962]
and Searle [1969] paving the way. The topics of analytic philosophy also became
highly language-dependent: presuppositions and inferences that are implicitly coded
into English depend on the way English wraps up the meaning, while in other natural
languages other presuppositions and inferences can be found, not necessarily coincid-
ing with the English ones. In 1960, Gustav Bergmann introduced the expression ‘the
linguistic turn’ to describe the change of focus towards language done by analytic
philosophy since at least Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (see Hacker [2013]). Since then,
in analytic philosophy, English has been simply taken for granted. In this respect,
analytical philosophy has been more Catholic than the Pope, while other branches
of philosophy, as well as science in general, did not accept this monopolistic role of
English until the 1990s; see the work of Ammon [1999, 2001, 2006], which provides
aggregate data for publications in the fields of biology, chemistry, physics, medicine,
and mathematics.
The second episode we wish to mention is the migration of leading figures in
philosophy of science and in science from German-speaking countries to English-
speaking countries, particularly those places that now coincide with key analytic phi-
losophy hubs. This happened, as the reader will have guessed, during the critical pe-
riod that preceded the Second World War, specifically from 1933, when Hitler gained
power in Germany. This massive migration widely affected (Jewish) scientists from
different fields, from medicine to physics, from sociology to pedagogy, and philoso-
phers (Ash and Söllner [2002]). The episode is worth mentioning for two reasons.
First, many of the scholars who migrated were philosophers and scientists en-
gaged in the activities of the Vienna Circle. Eminent thinkers such as Carnap, Neu-
rath, or Gödel left continental Europe and continued their career in theAnglo-American
World. One thing these philosophers were interested in was developing a rigorous
empirical philosophy, far from untestable metaphysical theses, and capable of grad-
ually building a universal knowledge; an explicit critical target was the philosophy
of Martin Heidegger, attacked by Carnap [1932], in an article originally published
in German, and translated into English only much later. Vienna Circle philosophers
contributed to identifying ‘good’ philosophy with rigorous, formalizable, or formal-
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ized reasoning. A notable example in this endeavour is the Vienna Circle manifesto
Neurath [1973] and the idea of a planned International Encyclopædia of Unified Sci-
ence. Much of present-day analytic philosophy, and also what is now called ‘formal
philosophy’ or ‘mathematical philosophy’, stems from the philosophy of the Vienna
Circle (see e.g. Horsten and Douven [2008] or Leitgeb [2013]; for a pluralistic plea,
instead, see Haack [2005]). This is not to establish a lineage between the emigrated
Vienna Circle philosophers with the the widespread standardisation in argumentation
typical of contemporary analytic philosophy (that we criticised earlier in section 2),
but rather to explain how that philosophical tradition - in the beginning rather multi-
lingual and certainly not hostile to viewing science and knowledge as distributed or
embodied - came to speak English.
Second, that English is the de facto ‘official’ language of analytic philosophy is a
clear historical contingency, but important for our discussion: these philosophers and
scientists active in Vienna and Austria were German native speakers, who only later
used English as their main working language, once they migrated. This might seem
an innocent remark but Wolters [2015] notes that in a widely read and distributed
pedagogical resource as The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the entry ‘logical
positivism’ does not appropriately acknowledge its Austrian-German roots, merely
alluding at British roots via British empiricism - whose main representative is, ad-
mittedly, Bertrand Russell. So, suddenly, big chunks of influential and fundamental
philosophical traditions are obfuscated behind the Anglo-American ones. This creates
historical distortions that may have important repercussions for younger scholars ap-
proaching the field. Moreover, that the research agenda of philosophy of science was
set by exclusively English speaking scholarship was also noted byMcCallister already
in 2008 (McAllister [2008]).
One might think the migration of German-speaking scholars to English-speaking
countries should have favoured the circulation of ideas, thus contributing to epistemic
diversity. To some extent this is correct, and is also evidenced by historical investi-
gations on circulation of knowledge and migration (see e.g. Hoch and Platt [1993]).
However, what has been observed since then, is a gradual takeover of English as the
main working language and of the methods of analytic philosophy as the preferred
ones, thus leading to a de facto standardization of philosophical jargon and of argu-
mentation strategies. No doubt these are also effects of the widespread publish-or-
perish culture: we need as many research outputs published, and in internationally
recognised venues. As it turns out, publication venues with the highest reputation
publish (only) in English, as evidenced by the main international rankings, where
at the top there are mainly – or even only – venues coming from English-speaking
countries.
This rather long preamble serves to establish the following points. First, it is a
(historical) contingency that analytic philosophy came to speak English – there is no
a priori or theoretical reason for why it should be so. For instance, Vienna Circle
philosophers entertained academic relations outside the German-speaking world –
see e.g. Stadler [2007]. Second, and relatedly, the analytic-inclined philosophers and
scientists on the continent used to work in a multilingual setting while launching the
discipline.
When looking at the de facto linguistic monopoly of English in analytic philoso-
phy, two main issues may be raised, which really concern the whole of philosophy
and of science. The first issue comes from the perspective of sociolinguistics and in
particular linguistic justice: a whole-and-only English speaking academic community
creates profound injustices among its community members, precisely for non-native
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speakers. In the context of analytic philosophy, English is often referred to as a Lin-
gua Franca. However, we are sceptical that this is the function English really serves in
scientific communication nowadays. Thus, section 4 discusses and problematizes the
notion of Lingua Franca, and section 5 presents the main philosophical positions on
the current debate on linguistic justice, in relation to the problem of the language(s)
of science. The second issue comes from an epistemological perspective. We think
that the exclusive use of English greatly restricts the options for developing rich and
sophisticated conceptual apparati, as the knowledge we produce is intimately linked
to the linguistic, epistemic, and socio-cultural instruments that we use. This was dis-
cussed earlier in section 1 and 2, with explicit reference to the notion of ‘knowledge’.
In both section 4 and 5, we put forward proposals to minimise linguistic injustices
and to foster epistemic diversity. In the concluding section we further reflect on the
feasibility of our proposals and on the value of our problematization of English as a
Lingua Franca …which ironically is happening in English.
4 What does the expression ‘Lingua Franca’ really
mean?
The expression ‘lingua franca’ comes from Latin; its precise etymology is unclear
Brosch [2015], but it is generally interpreted as a synonym of ‘free language’. It was
proposed originally by Hugo Schuchardt, the German linguist pioneer in the studies
of contact languages such as pidgins (Schuchardt [1909]), creoles (Schuchardt [1979]),
and International Auxiliary Languages (IALs)such as Volapük (Schuchardt [1888]). In
fact, for him, the lingua francawas a Vermittlungssprache, a ‘mediation language’, that
emerged because of the trading in the Mediterranean Sea during the Middle Ages be-
tween speakers of Romance languages such as Castilian, Catalan, Provençal, Ligurian,
Venetan, once in contact with Arabs and Turks. It was a sort of unstable pidgin for the
domain-specific purpose of trading. The original lingua franca was a mediation lan-
guage between speakers of different mother tongues and identities. Nobody owned
it, and this is the implication of the adjective franca – free – from any ownership, in
particular from the native speaker’s authority that stays behind most Kultursprachen,
cultural languages, such as German, French or Italian. The expression ‘lingua franca’
– regardless whether it is used for English or other languages – entails this claim of
ethnic freedom.
The scholarly literature on English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) - represented in partic-
ular by Barbara Seidlehofer [2011] and Jennifer Jenkins [2007] – reframed Schuchardt’s
expression advocating that English is neither the property of the English people nor of
any other ethnic group because of its terrific spread. A first argument, put forward by
the supporters of ELF, is the number of non-native speakers of English. In fact, accord-
ing to David Crystal, already in the early years of the newMillennium, the number of
non-native speakers outnumbers native speakers by a ratio 3 to 1 (Crystal [2003]). A
second argument, directly connected to the first, is the question of authority: English
natives do not hold anymore the ownership of the English language because they are
outnumbered. In the same period, David Graddol introduced the idea of the ‘decline
of the [English] native speaker’ in shaping the authoritative norms of usage Graddol
[2003].
So, paradoxically, the emergence of ‘New Englishes’ would reduce if not eliminate
the unfair privileged position of English natives in their communication with non-
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natives. The expression ‘New Englishes’ refers to self-standing varieties of English in
different areas of the world – in most cases post-colonial, but in the last decades re-
ferred to the use of English in the European continent too. However, the literature on
World Englishes shows that these varieties are not norm-providing, unlike English in
its proper language territory - i.e., UK, US, Canada, Australia andNewZealand. On the
contrary, World Englishes are norm-developing, when they come from post-colonial
countries, such as India, Nigeria, the Philippines. The situation is however different
if we analyse the English varieties used in contexts where other national languages
strongly shaped national identities, such as most countries in the European continent:
all these English varieties are clearly norm-dependent from the strongest standard va-
rieties, i.e. General American and Standard British English (Krachu [1992]).
This is all to say that ELF is not a self-standing variety of English but a commu-
nicative strategy used when interactions occur between non-native speakers that in
some contexts form norm-dependent or norm-developing varieties of English. An im-
portant consequence is that the authority of these English varieties cannot compete
with General American English or Standard British English. Therefore, on a global
level, the power of the English native speaker still holds. In other words, English is
never free from the authority of its native speaker, and the expression Lingua Franca
used in relation to it is merely metaphorical, running the risk of making things opaque
rather than clear.
We can ask ourselves if it is possible, in principle, to have a real Lingua Franca,
namely a language that is no-one’s property and that potentially belongs to every-
body, because no authority of native speakers exists. What Schuhardt called (in Ger-
man) a Vermittlungssprache ‘mediation language’, as we have seen above, is nowadays
generally referred as ‘pidgin’ by contemporary linguists. The original lingua franca
spoken in the Mediterranean Sea was a contact language used for the domain-specific
purpose of trading. Therefore, it fulfilled the requisites of having a truly ethnically
free language: it had no native speaker and there was no authority whatsoever con-
trolling or monitoring the language, so everybody was welcomed in using it. On the
other hand, this freedom came with a high price: the original lingua franca was not
equipollent to the Kunstsprachen, culture languages, that we consider the yardstick
for judging ‘languagehood’, e.g. English, French, Chinese or Arabic. In principle,
culture languages can be used for expressing all facets of human experience and the
world of nature. This is a prerequisite in the case of scientific communication: the
linguistic vehicles of expressing new ideas or innovative results cannot present in-
ternal limitations. Clearly, the original lingua franca, and pidgins in general, do not
respect this requisite. In fact, the club of the languages of science is very exclusive:
according to Ethnologue, there are currently more than 7,000 living languages in the
world; however, if we check all the original scientific production - even in a large
sense, including Western and Eastern antiquity - the languages of science in all the
history of humankind are less than 20 [Gordin, 2015, ch.1].
At the end of the 19th century, the search of the perfect language that founded the
European culture produced a plethora of language projects planned to fulfil the role
of the language of science (Eco [1993]). These language projects were often designed
specifically to become a language of science if not the main one, and they all shared
two properties. First, they were ‘international’, meaning that they did not belong
to any nations: they were ethnically free; second, they were considered ‘auxiliary’,
meaning that they should be used mainly for written purposes and in particular for
scientific communication, without the aim to replace existing languages, and in par-
ticular national languages. Because of these two properties, during the first half of the
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20th century they were collectively called International Auxiliary Languages (IALs) –
for a classic account, see Large [1985].
Unfortunately, only a dozen or so were put in use in practice in order to be tested
for this important function, such as Peano’s Latino sine Flexione, Couturat’s Ido,
IALA’s Interlingua; however, only one did succeed to form a stable community of
practice, showing that a general-purpose planned language is not a philosopher’s
dream but a human reality, that is Esperanto (Gobbo [2015]). Are IALs in general,
and Esperanto in particular, good candidates for fulfilling the role of the real Lingua
Franca, specifically for scientific communication? From an epistemological point of
view, unlike English or any other national languages, they are a priori ethnically free,
that is no special ethnic group can claim for itself the property of these languages.
However, in the case of Esperanto it is also true that the community of practice holds
the language: in order to become a fluent speaker of Esperanto, the learner should
enter the community, as there are some metaphors, expressions and even idioms that
are built inside the community and they cannot be easily understood externally, or
even translated, without an extensive commentary (Fiedler [1999]). Moreover, there
are more or less one thousand families who speak Esperanto at home, and, even if
these bilingual Esperanto speakers do not play a distinct role in terms of authority
on the language, according to some commentators, they challenge the ethnic neu-
trality of the language – see for instance, Fiedler [2012]. The sociolinguistic reality
of Esperanto in the 21st century shows that the Esperanto community succeeded in
building a small but vivid non-national culture that voids the positivistic claim that
IALs are, by definition, culture-free. However, the Esperanto culture is secondary, as
any Esperanto speakers belong to at least one other language community – as mono-
lingual Esperanto speakers simply do not exist – and they live most of the time in
societies using languages others than Esperanto. In practice, for most aspects of ev-
eryday life, the culture of reference for an Esperanto speaker is not the Esperanto
culture.
We can prudently conclude that no language is completely neutral, but Esperanto
is somehow more neutral than others. This leads us to problematize the issue of
linguistic justice, which is apparently not ensured by English, for it is not a Lingua
Franca.
5 Linguistic justice in scientific communication
The expression ‘linguistic justice’ is relatively new. It started being usted in the 1990s,
when the emergence of issues of language diversity recognition received the attention
of political philosophers, dealing with the principles behind the design of language
policy actions. In this sense, linguistic justice is modelled in a similar vain to socio-
economic justice or environmental justice. An interesting line of research would be
the investigation of the possible connections with with epistemic justice, as depicted
by Fricker [2007], as the author’s notion of identity power could be put in relation with
linguistic justice, because of the role that language has in shaping identity; however,
such an investigation would require an entire new paper, therefore we cannot delve
into it here. Although it is relatively new, there is already a considerable literature
in the field, well presented by Alcalde [2018] and Alcalde [2015]. According to the
author, the notion of linguistic justice has no generally accepted definition because of
the echoes of the liberalism-communitarianism debate that still divides the reflections
in two approaches: the constitutivists understand languages as constitutive parts of
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identity construction of groups, while instrumentalists see languages as primary tools
to perform non-linguistically defined things by single actors. While constitutivists
tend to consider groups as legitimate agents in pursuing linguistic justice, instrumen-
talists generally see single individuals as the solely types of agents having the right
to claim linguistic justice for themselves.
This distinction between constitutivists and instrumentalists still hold in the appli-
cation of linguistic justice in scientific communication. This is a specialized domain of
use, where ‘internationality’ is a crucial property that refers to cross-border commu-
nication between native speakers of different languages. Advocates of English-only
policy typically put forward instrumentalist arguments; for instance, English is al-
ready the de facto vehicular language of science since the end of the Second World
War, and English has traditionally been the language of analytic philosophy. It is im-
portant to note that one of the main arguments used by instrumentalists is that the
emergence of only one language is inevitable for the need of efficiency in economies
of scale: the more scientists are spread through the world, the more they need only
one common language, in order to be fast and effective. This language happens to be
English. In truth – as Robert Phillipson has shown in several publications – the ex-
pansion of English worldwide in higher education and, by extension, in research and
science, was not an effect of free market, but a crucial part of Winston Churchill’s
political plan in the aftermath of the war (Phillipson [1992]). However, in instrumen-
talist terms, political factors are irrelevant: the main point, relevant to our discussion,
is that (English) monolingualism is put forward as the most viable solution – that is,
efficient and fair at the same time – for international communication in every context.
Philippe Van Parijs [2011] brought this line of reasoning to its extreme consequences:
for him, English is the necessary linguistic tool to achieve a global solidarity based
on the equality of opportunities in mastering English, regardless of the territory of
provenance. According to the author, this equality of opportunities can be achieved
through a “global tax to the native English community” in order to compensate “the
linguistically handicapped”, i.e. people whose mother tongue is not English, who
will “poach the web” as free riders to reduce their ‘handicap’. Moreover, non-English
governments should ban dubbing in shows so that the youngsters can improve their
knowledge of the English language.
If we transpose this apologetic discourse around ELF within the context of publi-
cation of results in philosophy and in science, the result will be that such defence is
simply untenable. First, as we have seen in section 3, the research centres in analytical
philosophy are mainly in Great Britain, North America, and Australia, not in places
where World Englishes – in the sense illustrated above – are used, such as Pakistan
or Nigeria. This means that no varieties of English can be accepted in scholarly pub-
lications other than British Standard English and/or American General English, and,
according to our experience, this is by and large valid for all scientific disciplines. It
has been suggested that the English register used in academic publication should be
less strict, in order to reduce – to some extent – the unfair advantage held by col-
leagues having English as their respective mother tongue. Unfortunately, this seems
not to be standard practice in the majority of journals we know of. We are in fact not
aware of any peer-review journal that states in the Author’s guidelines “we accept
papers written in ELF”. Therefore, in direct opposition to the Native English Tax that
should eliminate the linguistic handicap and that van Parijs dreamt of, we face instead
a real Academic Non-Native English Tax whenever an English non-native submits a
manuscript for publication to any English-speaking venue.
This tax is paid in terms ofmoney – outsourcing the proofreading to a professional
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native speaker – and in terms of time – writing through a non-native language slows
down all the process, also because of a perpetual sense of linguistic insecurity, i.e.
the feeling that the author’s English register is not adequate for the readers who will
evaluate it through the peer-review process.
If we mention the years a non-native spends to achieve a reasonable level of profi-
ciency in academic English in contrast to a native speaker, it will be crystal clear that a
native speaker will have lots of time – literally, years – to delve into the studying of the
discipline instead of following English language courses or academic writing classes.
To make the situation even worse, it should be mentioned the effort that many aca-
demics, expatriated from their original country, put in settling down in academic and
every-day environments that do not speak English. Believe it or not, Dutch academia
speaks Dutch, French academia speaks French, etc. – academic life is not just writing
papers, but also admin meetings and teaching BA courses, all of which is most often
done in the local, national language, rather than English. The point is that the concept
of ELF is based on the false belief of freedom (from native speakers), which does not
hold in the context of scientific communication. From the point of view of the consti-
tutivist, the following argument can also be made: at the group level, the community
of, say, analytic philosophers has become highly homogeneous also because of the
unfair advantage English native scholars have in all the process that eventually leads
to the publication of original research results (this can be easily checked by looking
at who publishes in the top journals, who gets jobs in top departments, etc.).
Linguistic justice in scientific communication means that every actor in the pro-
cess should not have unfair advantage because of their linguistic repertoire; however,
this is in fact much dependent on the ‘birthright lottery’, i.e. the accidental circum-
stances of birth which have crucial consequences in terms of citizenship (Shachar
[2009]). If we apply a case scenario analysis on the basis of what we have said until
now, we can figure out an ideal case, an undesired case, and a realistic case, which
usually stands in the middle of the former two.
In an ideal scenario, all members of a given academic community should publish
their results as bilingual original texts. One of the two languages would the lan-
guage of their choice, typically their mother tongue, or in any case the Kultursprache
in which they are most comfortable in. The other language should be the less non-
neutral language ready for scientific communication we have at our disposal, namely
Esperanto. In this way, they would use a linguistic medium that allows them a maxi-
mum efficiency while, on the other hand, the flexibility of Esperanto as a translation
language permit to reproduce with reasonable approximation the content of the Kul-
tursprache. Another advantage relies on the process of bilingual writing: the author
is forced to jump from one language to the other, and in this multilingual process
some peculiarities typically referred to the original culture of reference of the mother
tongue will be removed, as they would be considered not ‘international’ enough. Of
course, there is an obvious disadvantage in writing bilingually, regardless of the lan-
guage: the time needed to produce the bilingual text is longer, at least double, than
writing a monolingual text. And given the current burden of the publish-or-perish
culture (not to mention the increased admin and teaching load for both temporary
and permanent staff), this is not a viable option. In any case, the ideal scenario is, as
the word suggests, not feasible in practice, as it would require a complete change of
route in the publication process of an entire discipline. Such a broad consensus in any
given community is science-fiction, not science. Thus, the ideal scenario turns out to
be, somehow, an undesirable scenario.
What we propose is a realistic scenario that keeps an open editorial line in linguis-
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tic terms. This allows us to retain the gist behind the ideal scenario: a multilingual
strategy in writing the research results in philosophy and in science, will lead to better
papers in terms of quality, improved because of the parallel text, as there are at least
two cultural frames of reference to be taken into account in the production process. In
more concrete terms, we would favour the reception of manuscripts written not just
in English but also in any other recognised Kultursprachen such as French or German,
with the addition of three abstracts, one in the language of the author’s choice, one
in the de facto international language, i.e. English, and the last one in Esperanto, for
the sake of ethnic neutrality. As far as we know, this multilingual editorial policy is
followed only by one academic journal devoted to language policy and planning issue,
called Language Problems & Language Planning, LPLP), as a concrete message for ac-
cepting non-mainstream views on the topic. In philosophy of science, some journals
follow a much milder multilingual policy, allowing for submissions in two languages;
for instance, in principle, Erkenntnis accepts both German and English, Theoria both
Spanish and English, Lato Sensu in French and English, Epistemologia in Italian and
English. In fact, however, many of these journals are increasingly publishing in En-
glish only.
We submit that amultilingual solution, preservingmultilingualism at least through
the translation of abstracts, following the example of LPLP, should be applied to jour-
nals in philosophy and science. Such a solution would allow scholars to expressmore
points of view linked to the cultural tradition of the different languages involved, and
eventually it would lead to more epistemic diversity, was our original concern in the
paper. That knowledge is not just or solely propositional was our initial concern. We
suggested that embracing a conception of knowledge as distributed and embodied
fosters epistemic diversity. Distribution and embodiment, we submit, do include cul-
ture and, therefore, language. For this reasons knowledge production that happens
in multilingual, rather than monolingual environment, should likewise contribute to
fostering epistemic diversity, both in philosophy and in science.
6 Multilingual academic environments: back to the
future?
It is a fact that philosophy and science speak English: mainly or solely, but certainly
enough to pose the question about whether a monolingual philosophical tradition be
desirable at all. There are interesting stories to be told about why it is so, and we
mentioned two in section 3: the linguistic turn in philosophy of language around the
half of the last century and the migration of scholars (philosophers and scientists)
from German-speaking countries to English-speaking countries before the Second
World War. Although it is largely a historical contingency that a significant part of
philosophy speaks English only, we find this problematic for two reasons: linguis-
tic justice and epistemic diversity. Linguistic justice refers to the uneven conditions
that different speakers encounter while speaking a same language: clearly English
native speakers remain advantaged over non-native speakers, no matter how fluent
we, non-native speakers, become. This means that English, contrary to what is usu-
ally thought, is no Lingua Franca. Epistemic diversity refers to the consequences that
a monolingual situation has at the level of the epistemic apparati that speakers have
or produce, in order to make sense of the world around us. These epistemic apparati
may be sophisticated philosophies or folk worldviews each one of us has.
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We explained that languages are non-neutral tools for the working philosopher;
on the contrary, the choice of a language of science entails a reference to a whole
school of thought, culture, norms, etc. This can be iconically represented by bibli-
ographies – with a partial exception of this paper bibliography, which is mainly, but
not entirely, in English. At the time of Bertrand Russell, when analytic philosophy
was at its infancy stage, it was normal to have bibliographic entries of new philo-
sophical and scientific papers in more than one language, including not only English,
French and German but also Latin and sometimes Russian and Japanese. In contem-
porary philosophy and science, bibliographies contain too often English-only items.
This produces a vicious circle: nobody reads anymore the research written in other
languages, and therefore philosophers and scientists more and more publish their pa-
pers only in English, in order to gain attention by their communities of reference. We
can call this phenomenon the tyranny of tradition.
In pursuing the English-only policy, we obtain that the access of some classics
is severely limited in new generations of researchers who do not come – by chance,
because of the birthright lottery – from multilingual societies, as their educational
and research institutions do not value multilingualism as an asset for pursuing sci-
entific research in general and analytic philosophy in particular. A typical example
of this loss in the realm of science is the link between Russian and the Soviet school
of science: after the fall of USSR the prestige of Russian was severely damaged at the
international level; therefore, some scientific results were rediscovered only decades
after in English, for the only reason that nobody had read the relevant literature in
Russian, where the same results had been obtained well beforehand. A case in point is
the interlingua model for machine translation by Soviet pioneer Troyanskii Hutchins
and Evgenii [2000].
Behind the concept of Lingua Franca there is not only the idea that such a language
is supposed to be franca, i.e. a posteriori ethnically free, but there is also the idea that
using a language or another in order to express oneself is basically the same in terms
of expressiveness. If it is true that potentially all languages can express every nuance
of the human experience, it is also true that some languages are more elaborated
than others, if we take domains of use as the reference. Hypothetically speaking, a
language spoken by a population living in a tropical island with no mountains will
have a lot of lexicon about navigation and no word for “snow”. This does not imply
that that hypothetical population cannot invent a word for “snow” when they happen
to have the new experience. So, a language will be more apt to express philosophy and
science if such domains already exist in its history, in other words, if philosophical
and scientific communication were already published in that language.
Although some scientific publications in Esperanto and other IALs do exist, Kul-
tursprachen such as English, French and German havemuchmore tradition. However,
if this argument of tradition is pushed to its limites, it will turn out that, in philosophy
(as well as science), only English will be the language ready off-the-shelf to publish
all the nuances of the discipline. This clearly goes in a direction opposite to the one
we have indicated, and one that will heavily hinder epistemic diversity. Instead, we
think that multilingual environments are part and parcel of the way in which we pro-
duce knowledge. Knowledge, as we argued in section 2, is a distributed and embodied
phenomenon also at the level of language.
Our purpose was to reflect on the current limits of monolingual academic environ-
ments, which analytic philosophy is an example of, and to make practical suggestions
to improve on a situation that we deem problematic. To get out of the monolingual
impasse, we proposed a multilingual strategy according to which a liberal editorial
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policy allows publication of articles not only in English but also in any recognized
Kultursprachen such as French or German, and abstract in three languages: one cho-
sen by the author, English (as a de facto international language), and Esperanto (in the
interest of ethnic neutrality). Luckily, just like nations, all languages are imagined (not
imaginary) and therefore they can be planned and (re)shaped by their speech commu-
nities according to their needs. We think that the multilingual strategy we proposed
can open the door to a more diverse community of philosophers and scientists, and
foster, consequently, epistemic diversity.
At this point it is worth to briefly comment on the possibility of translating more,
in order to compensate for the linguistic injustice introduced by the prominent use
of English. Sometimes machine translation is evoked as a solution to all language
problems, which eventually proved not to be, as the quest of a fully automatized,
general-purpose, instant machine-only translation started since at least the 1950s
(Léon [2002]). That quest did not reach the sought results, and no serious research
in Artificial Intelligence makes anymore such a promise nowadays. However, it is
true that statistical machine translation and in general computer-assisted transla-
tion had achieved impressive results in the last decades (Koehn [2012]). However, as
these statistical-based engines are finally based on bilingual corpora available in digi-
tal form, the quality of the translation from and to English is fairly better compared to
other languages. Thus, even in the case ofmachine translation, it is a driving force that
ultimately brings to Englishization rather than to some more equitable form of mul-
tilingualism. The possibility that more translations of non-English texts (for instance
in analytic philosophy, but also in other fields) may redress an otherwise unbalanced
and unjust situation has been also discussed by Schliesser [2018]. Yet, Schliesser is
very careful in noticing that translations (and, a fortiori, machine translations too)
are no panacea. For, just as any text is culturally-laden so is any translation of it. We
agree with this argument.
The realistic scenario hereby sketched should be also accompanied by broad poli-
cies that encourage scholars to learn other languages as part of their education pro-
grammes, from Bachelor to PhD level and beyond. There is no shortcut guaranteed
by digital technologies. The only feasible way is to rely on humans. Linguists have
been saying it for decades: it is never too late to learn another language! We should
also promote reading at least some primary literature in original language (if it is not
in English). Perhaps there are interesting editorial projects to start. Finally, a number
of ‘best practices’ fostering collegial and respectful behaviour are already in place,
prompted especially by underrepresented groups in the profession, especially women
(see e.g. swipuk.org). These best practices, which work quite well in conferences and
seminars, may help mitigate linguistic injustice and foster epistemic diversity too.
Analogous best practices may (or, perhaps, should) be extended to academic publish-
ing.
Earlier in section 3 we briefly mentioned that a thorough discussion about lan-
guage policies also concern teaching in higher education. At the moment, in fact, in a
number of non-English speaking countries, heated debates are taking place about the
bilingual or English-only programmes. In the Netherlands, for instance, the Faculty
of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam published a Taalbeleid document – a
document about language policy.2 Given the successful results of internationalisation
strategies, the question arises about the taalvaardigheiden, i.e. the language skills that




students ought to develop in their mother tongue (in this case, Dutch). The document
suggests heading towards a bilingual faculty, where Dutch and English have the same
importance. Notwithstanding the appeal of such resolution, conceptual and practical
difficulties have been raised by students and staff members alike. For one thing, one
should be careful not to sell ‘internationalisation strategies’ (which is really why the
UvA pushed for developing programmes in English) under the label ‘diversity’. For
another, a bilingual environment would also increase theworkload substantially (both
for international staff, who should quickly reach proficiency inDutch, and for national
staff, who may not be proficient in English).3 In Italy, a recent verdict on the language
of instruction at university level raised analogous concerns (Salomone [2018]). It is
worth noting that the perspective in Italy is different than in the Netherlands, as in
Italy traditionally innovative research in the humanities – as well as in hard sciences,
at least until the last two decades, following a tradition that starts from Galilei until
Enrico Fermi – was made mostly (if not exclusively) in Italian.
The academic world is turning to a monolingual setting, which calls for appropri-
ate reflection at linguistic and socio-linguistic level, at epistemological and pedagog-
ical level, and at historical level. We make here no claim to solve any issues, but we
hope to contribute to a self-reflective exercise that we deem a valuable, and indeed
necessary, step before any other measures in the linguistic policy in the academe is
implemented. Ironically, one may say, the whole discussion in this paper is made in
English. We are of course not rejecting English in toto, and if English is de facto the
most used language in philosophy and in science, the point is worth making by using
this medium. What we propose in also an exercise helping minimize ‘imperialistic
attitudes’ at both linguistic and epistemic level.
In sum, that philosophy and science speak mainly, or solely, English is a fact.
However, looking at English as a candidate Lingua Franca of scientific communica-
tion shows that this is a delusion. English is neither ethnically nor epistemological
neutral, as we have shown above. Yet, we can try holding on the concept of Lingua
Franca and looking for candidates that fulfil the role of the language of science. Should
this language exist, we could use it scientific communication. The results of such re-
search aren’t, however, promising. It seems that there is no perfect candidate for it.
Only Esperanto comes close: it is only a partially neutral language, with respect to
ethnicity but not at the epistemological level. Perhaps the mistake lies in believing in
the existence of a Lingua Franca. But, at this point, this seems rather an illusion. The
concept of Lingua Franca hides multilingualism behind the curtain. It is high time to
remove the curtain and bring multilingualism under the sunlight.
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